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THE LINNAEAN HIERARCHY AND THE EVOLUTIONIZATION OF TAXONOMY,
WITH EMPHASIS ON THE PROBLEM OF NOMENCLATURE
KEVIN DE QUEIROZ

Department of Vertebrate Zoology
National Museum of Natural History
Smithsonian Institution
Washington, District of Columbia 20560
ABSTRACT

During the post-Darwinian history of taxonomy, the Linnaean hierarchy has maintained its role as
a means for representing hierarchical taxonomic relationships. During the same period, the principle
of descent has taken on an increasingly important role as the basis for reformulated versions of
fundamental taxonomic concepts and principles. Early in this history, the principle of descent provided
an explanation for the existence of taxa and implied a nested, hierarchical structure for taxonomic
relationships. Although an evolutionary explanation for taxa contradicted the Aristotelian context within which the Linnaean hierarchy was developed, the nested, hierarchical structure of taxonomic rela·
tionships implied by evolution was compatible with the practical use of the Linnaean hierarchy for
conveying hierarchical relationships and seems to have reinforced this practice. Later changes associated with the development of taxon concepts based on the principle of descent led to changes in the
interpretation of the Linnaean categories as well as certain modifications related to use of the Linnaean
hierarchy in representing phylogenetic relationships. Although some authors questioned use of the
Linnaean hierarchy in phylogenetic taxonomies, most continued to use it in one form ot artother. More
recently, taxonomists have considered the relevance of the principle of descent to nomenclature. They
have found fundamental inconsistencies between concepts of taxa based on that principle and methods
currently used to define taxon names, which are based on the Linnaean hierarchy. Although these
inconsistencies can be corrected without totally eliminating the Linnaean hierarchy, the necessary
changes would greatly reduce the importance of that hierarchy, particularly in the area of nomenclature.
Moreover, the earlier development of taxon concepts based on the principle of descent effectively
proposed taxonomic categories of greater theoretical significance than those of the Linnaean hierarchy.
The historical trend of granting increasing importance to the principle of descent has reduced the
significance of the Linnaean hierarchy to the point where it may no longer be worth retaining.
Key words: evolution, Linnaean hierarchy, nomenclature, phylogeny, principle of descent, taxon
names, taxonomic categories, taxonomic definitions, taxonomy.

INTRODUCTION

For almost 250 years, the Linnaean hierarchy has
served as an important part of taxonomy's methodological foundation. During the last 140 of those years,
the theory of evolution--or more accurately, the principle of common descent-has steadily increased its
contribution to taxonomy's theoretical foundation.
These two cornerstones of contemporary taxonomy,
the Linnaean hierarchy and the principle of descent,
have coexisted harmoniously through most of their
common previous history, but recently there have been
signs that this situation cannot endure. After surviving
the revolution brought about by initial acceptance of
an evolutionary world view, as well as the more localized taxonomic reforms of the New Systematics and
Phylogenetic Systematics, the Linnaean hierarchy is
being challenged by a movement to extend an evolutionary world view into the realm of nomenclature.
This challenge affects most directly various nomenclatural principles and rules based on the Linnaean bier-

archy, but it also raises questions about the appropriateness and usefulness of the Linnaean hierarchy itself
as the basis for present and future taxonomy.
In this paper I will examine the relationship between
the Linnaean hierarchy and the principle of descent in
taxonomy, emphasizing their conflict in the area of
nomenclature. First, I will present some definitions,
both to clarify my use of certain terms and to provide
background information on both the Linnaean hierarchy and the principle of descent that are relevant to
understanding their roles in modem taxonomy. I will
then describe a series of changes in the principles and
methods of taxonomy that I interpret as manifestations
of the progressively more thorough acceptance of an
evolutionary world view. In each case, I will examine
the consequences of the change for the Linnaean hierarchy. I will discuss in greatest detail the most recent
of these changes, which centers on the issue of nomenclature, describing how this change, unlike the
previous ones, involves a more direct conflict between
the Linnaean hierarchy and the principle of descent. I
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will then address some misunderstandings, both actual
and anticipated, concerning the replacement of the
Linnaean hierarchy with the principle of descent as the
foundation of the nomenclatural system. And finally, I
will reassess the more general role of the Linnaean
hierarchy in modem taxonomy.
BACKGROUND AND DEFINITIONS OF TERMS

In order to describe changes in the history of taxonomy related to the increasing importance granted to
the principle of descent and their implications for the
Linnaean hierarchy, I first need to define some terms.
These definitions are intended to emphasize the relationship between the Linnaean hierarchy and the principle of descent with regard to their roles as comerstones of taxonomy in general and nomenclature in
particular. In addition, they are meant to make clear
how I am using the defined terms rather than to describe how those terms have been used by other authors.

The Linnaean Hierarchy and the Principle of
Descent
The Linnaean hierarchy is the series of ranked taxonomic categories based on those adopted by Linnaeus
(1758) to which taxa (named groups of organisms) are
assigned. Linnaeus was not the first person to use taxonomic categories (Mayr 1982), but his categories
formed the basis of most subsequent taxonomic systems. Linnaeus himself used six taxonomic categories-Regnum (Kingdom), Classis (Class), Ordo (Order), Genus (Genus), Species (Species), and Varietas
(Variety). Later taxonomists added the categories Family and Division (botany) or Phylum (zoology), and
they reduced the significance of Variety (botany) or
eliminated it entirely (zoology), to form a set of seven
principal categories. These seven principal categories-Kingdom, Division/Phylum, Class, Order, Family, Genus, and Species-are often treated as obligatory or mandatory (e.g., Simpson 1961; Mayr 1969a),
so that a given organism must be assigned to a taxon
in every one of them to be considered "satisfactorily
classified" (Simpson 1961 : 18). Contemporary taxonomists also use several nonmandatory primary categories (e.g., Cohort, Tribe, Section, Series) as well as
various nonmandatory secondary categories derived
from the primary ones by attaching a rank-modifying
prefix (e.g., Subclass, Infraorder, Superfamily) (see
Jeffrey 1989 for a summary). Nevertheless, the contemporary hierarchy of taxonomic categories is basically Linnaean in that first, it is derived historically
from the hierarchy of categories used by Linnaeus
himself and second, its core is made up in a large part
by the original Linnaean categories. The Linnaean hierarchy is a hierarchy of taxonomic categories and
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should not be confused with taxonomic hierarchy in
general, that is, with hierarchies of taxa. A series of
nested taxa is intrinsically hierarchical (i.e., ranked or
graded) regardless of whether its component taxa are
assigned to taxonomic categories. Moreover, hierarchies of taxa can be represented by other means than
taxonomic categories, for example, using diagrams, alphabetic or numeric position markers, or indentation.
The principle of descent is the doctrine that living
things are related through common descent (as opposed to a theory about the specific mechanism of evolutionary change). It is what many people call the
"fact" of evolution-the idea that the diversity of life
is the result of descent with modification. The principle
of descent is thus the most general evolutionary principle. In the context of taxonomy, it is more fundamental than the idea of evolutionary change or the
similarities and differences resulting from such
change. Evolutionary change occurs only in the context of descent, but descent can occur without evolutionary change. Moreover, the fact that similarities and
differences in the characters of organisms are produced
by evolution does not automatically make a taxonomy
based on those properties evolutionary, as is evidenced
by countless artificial and preevolutionary taxonomies
based on the same characters (see de Queiroz 1988,
for further discussion).

Taxonomic and Nomenclatural Systems
The rest of the terms I will define are used to designate different kinds of methodological systems, that
is, integrated or organized sets of conventions (including principles, rules, and recommendations) designed
to achieve some particular end. In the present context,
it is important to distinguish between taxonomic and
nomenclatural systems. A taxonomic system is an integrated set of conventions specifying how taxonomies
are to be constructed; a nomenclatural system is an
integrated set of conventions specifying how names
are to be applied-that is, for naming taxa and regulating the use of those names. These two kinds of
methodological systems should not be confused with
one another, though a given nomenclatural system
might be considered part of a more comprehensive taxonomic system. I consider rules concerning what kinds
of entities deserve to be recognized as taxa part of the
taxonomic system, while the nomenclatural system is
concerned with how those entities are named. It should
be noted that the term "system" is used in at least two
other senses in taxonomy, first, for taxonomies or classifications themselves (e.g., when they are described
as natural versus artificial systems, or when we refer
to Linnaeus's or Thome's system; see Nicolson 1997),
and second, for the biological entities that are recognized as taxa (e.g., when we talk about interbreeding
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systems or systems of common ancestry; see Griffiths
1974; de Queiroz 1988).

Linnaean and Phylogenetic Systems
For the purposes of the present paper, two kinds of
taxonomic and nomenclatural systems are of primary
interest. A Linnaean system, whether of taxonomy or
nomenclature, is a system based on the Linnaean hierarchy; a phylogenetic system is a system based on
the principle of descent. The relationships among Linnaean and phylogenetic systems of taxonomy and nomenclature are complex in that taxonomic systems can
be both Linnaean and phylogenetic, while nomenclatural systems must be either one or the other. I will
therefore briefly discuss some of those relationships
and their bearing on the classification of individual
taxonomic and nomenclatural systems.

Linnaean systems.-In the case of taxonomic systems,
the system used by Linnaeus himself was the original
Linnaean system. Although modern taxonomic systems differ from the original Linnaean system in certain respects, they also retain a number of components
of that system, one of the most important of which is
the assignment of taxa to categories in the Linnaean
hierarchy. If this characteristic-which serves to indicate rank or relative position in the taxonomic hierarchy-is considered the defining property of Linnaean taxonomic systems, then most contemporary
taxonomic systems are Linnaean systems. This is the
sense in which I will refer to Linnaean taxonomic systems in the remainder of the present paper. Among
contemporary approaches to taxonomy (e.g., synthetic,
phenetic, phylogenetic), there is considerable heterogeneity of opinion concerning the general concept of
taxonomic relationship as well as how actual relationships are to be analyzed. Nevertheless, when it comes
to the representation of taxonomic relationships-rather than their definition or determination-then (for the
most part) the various contemporary taxonomic approaches all use Linnaean systems (e.g., Simpson
1961; Davis and Heywood 1963; Mayr 1969a; Sneath
and Sakal 1973; Eldredge and Cracraft 1980; Stace
1980; Wiley 1981). Modern Linnaean systems of taxonomy are heterogeneous, and though their components have been described by various authors, they
have not been formally codified in the manner of certain nomenclatural roles (see below).
In the case of nomenclatural systems, modern systems differ from that used by Linnaeus himself (e.g.,
1737, 1751) in many respects. Linnaeus and his contemporaries were largely attempting to replace the
works of their predecessors (Nicholson 1991), including existing taxon names. But once Linnaeus's general
approach became widely accepted, later taxonomists
became more concerned with preserving existing
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names. In keeping with this difference, the nomenclatural precepts articulated by Linnaeus emphasize the
formation of taxon names, whereas many subsequently
developed roles (e.g., those related to priority) concern
the application of existing names in the context of revised taxonomies (for historical reviews see McNeill
and Greuter 1986; Ride 1986, 1988; Nicholson 1991;
Melville 1995). In any case, as will be explained in
detail below, both Linnaeus and most subsequent taxonomists used a method for defining taxon names
based on the Linnaean Hierarchy, and I will treat this
characteristic as the defining property of Linnaean nomenclatural systems. According to this definition, and
despite differences among the systems used in botany,
zoology, and microbiology, all of the widely used contemporary nomenclatural systems are Linnaean systems. Unlike contemporary Linnaean systems of taxonomy, contemporary Linnaean syste:rris of nomenclature have become highly formalized, with official governing congresses, commissions, and committees and
published codes (ICZN 1985; IUMS 1992; IBC 1994).

Phylogenetic systems.-Phylogenetic systems of taxonomy attempt to produce taxonomies that reflect phylogenetic relationships accurately and efficiently. As I
will describe below, the development of phylogenetic
taxonomic systems has been an extended process that
has been accomplished largely in conjunction with
Linnaean taxonomic systems. Thus, most phylogenetic
systems have used the basic conventions of Linnaean
systems (e.g., nested, nonoverlapping taxa and the Linnaean hierarchy), though some of the more recent ones
have added restrictions concerning what kinds of entities are to be recognized as taxa (monophyly) as well
as new conventions for representing relationships (e.g.,
new categories, sequencing) (see Eldredge and Cracraft 1980; Wiley 1981; Forey 1992). Ideally, however,
a phylogenetic system should retain only those elements that do not interfere with the accurate and efficient representation of phylogeny. Therefore, although any particular phylogenetic system is inevitably constrained by its history, if any of its conventions
are found to interfere with the accurate and efficient
representation of phylogeny, they may have to be modified or eliminated. Consequently, some recent phylogenetic systems have abandoned the Linnaean hierarchy (e.g., Hennig 1969, 1981, 1983; Ax 1987; de
Queiroz and Gauthier 1992).
In contrast with phylogenetic systems of taxonomy,
which have been developing for more than 100 years,
phylogenetic systems of nomenclature are a very recent invention. Indeed, the proposals of de Queiroz
and Gauthier (1990, 1992, 1994) seem to be the first
attempts to formulate nomenclatural conventions
based on the principle of descent. Although the general
concepts and principles of this system have been set
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out, its specific rules and recommendations are still in
the process of active development (e.g., de Queiroz
and Gauthier 1990, 1992, 1994; Sundberg and Pleijel
1994; Bryant 1994, 1996; Schander and Thollesson
1995; de Queiroz 1996; Lee 1996; Wyss and Meng
1996; Cantino et al. 1997). In any case, nomenclatural
systems based on the principle of descent currently
have neither official governing congresses, commissions, or committees nor published codes. Unlike the
case with taxonomic systems, phylogenetic systems of
nomenclature cannot be developed in conjunction with
Linnaean nomenclatural systems, because (as will be
explained below) the principle of descent and the Linnaean hierarchy provide alternative theoretical bases
for those systems and thus are in direct conflict.
THE EVOLUTIONIZATION OF TAXONOMY

The proposal to replace the Linnaean hierarchy with
the principle of descent as the foundation of the nomenclatural system can be interpreted as the beginning
of the most recent stage of what I will call the evolutionization of taxonomy. I will use this cumbersome
term to distinguish the long, drawn out process
through which taxonomy has become ever more firmly
based on the principle of common descent from the
sudden shift in outlook that accompanied the initial
widespread acceptance of that principle. Although the
extended process can be considered a revolution in the
sense that each of its stages involves a fundamental
conceptual shift, some people may wish to restrict the
term "Darwinian Revolution" to the events in some
shorter time interval immediately following the publication of Darwin's (1859) Origin of Species. Therefore, I will refer to the extended series of changes
through which the principle of descent has taken on a
progressively more important role in taxonomy as the
evolutionization of that discipline. The account that
follows is not intended to be a detailed chronicle of
the process of evolutionization; instead, it is intended
to describe some important stages in that process, emphasizing the common conceptual shift that underlies
each stage and the consequences of specific changes
for the Linnaean hierarchy.

Early Stages: The Explanation for Taxa and the
Structure of Taxonomic Relationships
Conceptual changes.-The earliest stages in the evolutionization of taxonomy were contemporaneous with
the Darwinian Revolution in the restricted sense. Initial acceptance of the idea that living things were related through common descent affected taxonomy in
at least two related ways. First, it provided an explanation in the form of an underlying cause for the order
that was manifested in existing taxonomies. Prior to
1859, numerous taxa had already been recognized and
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named based on similarities and differences in the
characters of organisms, but their existence was attributed to the Plan of the Creator or to some unknown
natural law (Darwin 1859). The theory of descent with
modification provided a scientific explanation for the
existence of taxa; in other words, the natural law responsible for the existence of taxa was no longer unknown. Second, the principle of common descent provided justification for a particular structure regarding
taxonomic relationships. If the order in nature resulted
from a divine plan known only to the Creator, or if the
natural law responsible for that order remained undiscovered, then the structure of taxonomic relationships
might take several possible forms. For example, taxa
might be partially overlapping or mutually exclusive,
and they might occur in regular numerical patterns,
such as fives, as proposed by the quinarians (see Winsor 1976; O'Hara 1988, 1991). On the other hand, if
the order in nature resulted from common descent,
then the structure of taxonomic relationships should
have one particular form. Specifically, the principle of
descent predicted a structure consisting of both nested
and mutually exclusive groups. Nested groups were
those formed by the descendants of successively more
remote common ancestors in a single lineage; mutually
exclusive ones by the descendants of ancestors whose
lineages had previously diverged. Partially overlapping
or intersecting groups were ruled out, or at least relegated to secondary status, nor was there any reason to
expect regular patterns of five.

Effects on taxonomic practice.-The first change, accepting evolution as the underlying cause of taxonomic order, contradicted the Aristotelian context within
which the Linnaean hierarchy was originally developed (see Cain 1958; Ereshefsky 1994). Although this
change was a necessary precursor to all subsequent
stages in the evolutionization of taxonomy, it did not
otherwise revolutionize taxonomic practice. By its
very nature, an evolutionary explanation for the existence of taxa did not call into question either existing
(nested, hierarchical) taxonomies or the methods that
had been used to produce them. Instead, the taxonomies themselves were effectively assumed as the phenomenon in need of an explanation, and, consequently,
the methods that had been used to produce them were
also tacitly accepted. The principle of descent was thus
granted a rather superficial role as an after-the-fact explanation or interpretation for previously recognized
taxa (de Queiroz 1988). Moreover, once the idea of
evolution was accepted, it could be used to explain
any group that had been recognized previously on the
basis of shared characters. Just as some groups could
be explained as having inherited their shared characters from common ancestors, others could be explained
as having evolved them through convergent or parallel
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modifications (de Queiroz 1988, 1992a). Accepting
evolution as the explanation for previously recognized
taxa did not, by itself, cause significant changes in the
methods of taxonomy, which seems to account for the
common claim that the principle of evolution had no
major impact on taxonomy. But this was not the only
change brought about by the evolutionary world view,
and others had significant effects on taxonomic practice.
Thus, the other major change associated with initial
acceptance of the principle of descent-the change
concerning the structure of taxonomic relationshipsinfluenced taxonomic practice significantly. The fact
that partially overlapping relationships were ruled out,
or at least demoted to secondary status, while nested
and mutually exclusive ones were granted primacy, affected both the taxonomies and the taxonomic diagrams produced by taxonomists (e.g., O'Hara 1988,
1991). These changes in taxonomic practice resulted
from granting to the principle of descent a much more
important role. By using the principle of descent to
rule out certain kinds of groups and validate others,
that principle was not being treated as a mere afterthe-fact explanation, as it was in the case of the first
change described above. Instead, it was effectively being treated as an axiom or basic principle from which
an important taxonomic concept-the general structure
of taxonomic relationships-was derived or deduced.
This difference in the role played by the principle of
descent-that is, no role or mere after-the-fact interpretation versus axiom or first principle-is a useful
criterion for assessing the impact of that principle on
other taxonomic concepts as well as on other disciplines (de Queiroz 1988). Moreover, all subsequent
stages in the evolutionization of taxonomy are interpretable as manifestations of a change in which the
principle of descent is granted the same kind of importance in other aspects of that discipline. I will return to this theme shortly, after addressing the effects
of these first two changes on the Linnaean hierarchy.

Effects on the Linnaean hierarchy.-Despite the importance of the early changes brought about by acceptance of the principle of descent, those changes did not
call the Linnaean hierarchy into question as the basis
for the taxonomic system; in fact, they may have promoted its use. The Linnaean hierarchy was easily reconciled with the initial changes stemming from acceptance of an evolutionary world view because its
groups-nested-within-groups structure mirrored the
taxonomic structure implied by the principle of descent. Therefore, not only could the idea of evolution
be accommodated by the Linnaean hierarchy, it almost
seemed to provide a justification for that hierarchy's
continued use. Darwin (1859:456) himself argued that
"the subordination of group to group in all organisms"
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followed naturally from "the view of common parentage of [allied] forms ... together with their modification," and that "the degrees of modification which
the different group have undergone, have to be expressed by ranking them under different so-called genera, sub-families, families, sections, orders, and classes" (p. 422). Most subsequent authors, with a few notable exceptions (e.g., Gilmour 1940, 1961; Sneath and
Sokall973; Nelson and Platnick 1981), have followed
Darwin in adopting the view that biological taxonomy
attempts to express evolutionary relationships and uses
the Linnaean categories to represent their hierarchical
structure (for some relatively recent examples see
Simpson 1961; Davis and Heywood 1963; Hennig
1966; Mayr 1969a; Crowson 1970; Eldredge and Cracraft 1980; Wiley 1981; Mayr and Ashlock 1991).

Intermediate Stages: Concepts of Taxa
Conceptual changes.-Two important stages in the evolutionization of taxonomy, both involving concepts of
taxa, occurred almost 100 years after publication of
The Origin. In the beginning of the 20th century, the
principle of descent still played a superficial role with
regard to concepts of taxa. Although that principle was
now widely accepted, taxa continued to be recognized
on the basis of similarity, with common descent invoked after-the-fact to explain why organisms shared
the characters in which they were similar. The principle of descent had not yet been granted the role of an
axiom or basic principle from which a concept of the
biological taxon was derived by deductive reasoning.
Changes in this situation were closely associated with
two important taxonomic movements, and though the
new concepts of taxa associated with those movements
were anticipated by earlier authors (for examples see
Mayr 1955; Craw 1992; Donoghue and Kadereit
1992), the movements nevertheless seem to correspond with periods of maximum discussion and
change.
The first change in taxon concepts was associated
with the New Systematics (e.g., Huxley 1940; Mayr
1942) of the Modem Evolutionary Synthesis (see
Mayr and Provine 1980 for general historical review).
One of the major contributions of the New Systematics
was a reformulated species concept. Concepts of species as groups of similar organisms were replaced with
concepts of species as populations (e.g., Mayr 1942)
or population lineages (e.g., Simpson 1951). This new
species concept was effectively derived from the theory of evolution in that the species category was
equated with a class of basic evolutionary units (e.g.,
Simpson 1961; Hull 1965; Mayr 1969b); not surprisingly, it necessitated the rejection of some taxa that
formerly had been considered distinct species as well
as the acceptance of other taxa that had not. Thus,
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phenotypically distinct forms that made up a single
interbreeding population were now considered morphs
rather than different species, and phenotypically similar forms that made up separate interbreeding populations were now considered separate cryptic or sibling
species rather than single species (de Queiroz 1992b,
1995).
The second change involving concepts of taxa was
associated with the movement known as Phylogenetic
Systematics or Cladistics (e.g., Hennig 1965, 1966;
Crowson 1970; Eldredge and Cracraft 1980; Wiley
1981; Ax 1987). One of the important contributions of
Phylogenetic Systematics was a reformulated concept
of the higher taxon. Concepts of higher taxa as groups
of similar species were replaced with concepts of higher taxa as clades, that is, monophyletic (holophyletic)
groups of species. This new concept of the higher taxon was derived directly from the principle of descent
in that it equated higher taxa with units of exclusive
common ancestry, and once again, it necessitated the
rejection of some previously recognized higher taxa as
well as the acceptance of others that had not been recognized previously. Thus, new higher taxa were recognized for groups of species that, despite their phenotypic dissimilarity, formed single clades. And previously recognized higher taxa were eliminated, despite the phenotypic similarity of their component
species, if they did not correspond with clades. In other
words, many new monophyletic taxa were recognized,
and many paraphyletic taxa were eliminated (there had
already been a trend to eliminate polyphyletic taxa).
Botanical examples of new ·monophyletic taxa that
were recognized as a result of reformulated higher taxon concepts include Stomatophyta, Polysporangiophyta, Eutracheophyta, Lignophyta, ·and Anthophyta
(see Crane and Kenrick 1997); examples of paraphyletic taxa that were eliminated include Bryophyta,
Pteridophyta, Progymnospermae and Gymnospermae.

Effects on the Linnaean hierarchy.-Both of these
changes in taxon concepts amounted to at least minor
revolutions within taxonomy, but neither called the
Linnaean hierarchy into question as the basis for the
taxonomic system. The changes affected the way in
which taxa were conceptualized, but they did not challenge the nested hierarchical structure of taxonomic
relationships, and consequently, they did not contradict
use of the Linnaean hierarchy for representing those
relationships. Nevertheless, both had implications for
the Linnaean hierarchy that affected it in more subtle
ways, and changes related to the evolutionization of
higher taxon concepts led some authors to question the
use of the Linnaean hierarchy.
Uncoupling of the species category.-The change
in species concepts effectively redefined the Linnaean
category Species--or more accurately, the term "spe-
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cies"-and uncoupled it from the rest of the Linnaean
hierarchy. Although Linnaeus himself granted special
status to genera (Cain 1958; Mayr 1982), later authors
tended to view all taxa as entities of more or less the
same kind with the assignment of those taxa to the
Linnaean categories indicating only their relative position in the taxonomic hierarchy. The reformulated
species concept implied that species (and subspecific
taxa) were entities of a fundamentally different kind
than supraspecific taxa: species were unitary populations or population lineages, whereas supraspecific
taxa were groups of such lineages. Furthermore, the
new species concept established an objective (if not
entirely operational) criterion for assigning taxa to the
species category ("ranking" of some authors), while
the criteria for assigning taxa to the various higher
categories remained subjective (e.g., Mayr 1969a).
Reformulation of the concept of the higher taxon
reinforced the distinction between species and supraspecific taxa. Equating higher taxa with clades established an objective criterion for recognizing such taxa
("grouping" of some authors) but not for assigning
them to the various categories of the Linnaean hierarchy. Thus, although higher taxa (as clades) were no
longer considered artificial, the higher Linnaean categories remained arbitrary ranks assigned to entities of
a single kind (clades), and higher taxa (as clades) remained entities of a fundamentally different kind than
species (as population lineages).

Basis of the higher categories.-The evolutionization of higher taxon concepts also prompted systematists to propose various modifications to the Linnaean
hierarchy concerning the theoretical basis of the supraspecific categories. One class of proposals attempted to provide a more objective and evolutionarily
meaningful basis for those categories. The most basic
of these proposals, which I will call Hennig's rule, was
that sister taxa must have the same absolute rankthat is, be assigned to the same Linnaean category
(e.g., Hennig 1966). Hennig's rule gained wide acceptance, at least in certain circles. Moreover, because sister groups are equivalent in terms of age of origin, its
application made taxa assigned to the same Linnaean
category equivalent in an evolutionarily important respect. This equivalence, however, was local in nature;
that is, it did not extend beyond immediate sister taxa.
A related proposal, also put forth by Hennig (1966;
see also Crowson 1970; Farris 1976), was to equate
the Linnaean categories with age classes. In Hennig's
proposal, taxa originating between the Cambrian and
Devonian would be assigned to a category of the Class
stage (Superclass, Class, Subclass, etc.) those originating between the Mississippian and Permian to a category of ordinal stage, and so forth. Under this proposal, approximate temporal equivalence would extend
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to all taxa assigned to the same Linnaean category, not
only to immediate sister groups. Despite the great potential benefits of such equivalence, the proposal to
equate the Linnaean categories with age classes was
not adopted by most subsequent authors (Ax 1987).

Table I. Values of primary categories and rank modifying prefixes used in Farris's (1976) systematic method for generating taxonomic categories.

Proliferation of higher categories and ways to avoid
it.-Several other modifications to the Linnaean hierarchy resulted from the evolutionization of other aspects of taxonomy, in particular, the development of
analytical methods designed specifically to reconstruct
phylogenetic relationships. The effects of these new
analytical methods on the Linnaean hierarchy were
primarily indirect, through the wealth of new monophyletic taxa that were revealed by their empirical application. Although systematists generally did not feel
compelled to name and rank (i.e., in one of the Linnaean categories) every new putative clade revealed
by their analyses, even the ones that they did choose
to name and rank often exceeded the limits imposed
by the 20 or so commonly used categories. Even the
34 categories that could be formed with more extensive use of the prefixes Super-, Sub-, and Infra- were
insufficient, though earlier authors (e.g., Simpson
1961) had thought that 34 categories was more than
would ever be needed. The problem was not that the
new taxonomies had more than 20-34 levels. Instead,
the new taxonomies often required more than the three
secondary categories that could be generated for adjacent primary categories using the standard prefixes
if they were to maintain consistency with the ranks of
more and less inclusive groups (e.g., tO maintain Tracheophyta as a Division arid Monocotyledoneae as a
Class). Moreover, even if no new clades were named
and ranked, systematists often wanted to convey the
corresponding information about phylogenetic relationships.
For these reasons, authors who preferred to name
newly recognized clades modified the Linnaean hierarchy further (remember that some modifications had
already been made) by adding new taxonomic categories. McKenna (1975), for example, in a influential
paper on the classification of mammals, used the new
primary category Legion and the new prefixes Magn-,
Grand-, and Mir- to generate several new levels between the traditional categories Class and Order. Similarly, the new prefixes Capax- and Parv- were used
by Gaffney and Meylan (1988). Extending this approach further, Farris (1976) proposed a systematic
method for generating new taxonomic categories based
on rank-modifying prefixes. In Farris's method, each
prefix was assigned a modifier value, which would be
added to or subtracted from the value of the primary
category with which the prefix was combined (see Table 1). Because no limit was placed on the number of
prefixes that could be used, Farris's method could gen-

Kingdom
Division/Phylum
Class
Cohort
Order
Family
Tribe
Genus
Species

Primary category ranks

Rank modifying prefixes

9
8
7
6
5

4
3
2

Gig a
Mega
Hyper
Super
(none)
Sub
Infra
Micro
Pico

+4
+3
+2
+I
0
l

-2
-3
-4

erate an infinite number of categories, including not
only new single-prefix categories such as Gigaclass
and Picocohort but also novel multiprefix categories
such as Supersuperorder and Submicropicofamily (see
Kron 1997 for additional examples). Despite the logic
of this proposal, it was not followed by most subsequent authors (but see Platnick 1977).
Other authors wished to avoid the proliferation of
both taxon names and taxonomic categories. Consequently, they introduced modifications to their taxonomic systems that conveyed information about phylogenetic relationships by other means than the Linnaean taxonomic categories. Nelson (1972, 1973)
pointed out that the sequence of taxon names in a list
could be used to convey information about relationships, a convention that was adopted by several subsequent authors {see Eldredge and Cracraft 1980; Wiley 1981; and referencestberein). Taxa branching successively from a single lineage in a tree were assigned
to the same category and listed in order of their
branching sequence so that each taxon in the list was
the sister· group of the group composed of all taxa
listed below it. This sequencing convention, as it latter
became known, greatly reduced the number of both
taxa and categories needed to convey information
about relationships, but it necessarily left many clades
unnamed. It also violated Hennig's rule.
Many of the most severe cases of taxon and category proliferation involved taxonomies that included
both extant and extinct taxa. Not only did extinct taxa
require their own names and ranks but, without sequencing, so did the more inclusive clades composed
of the extinct taxa and their closest relatives. Even
with sequencing, the convention that treated the seven
principal categories as mandatory often required recognizing redundant (monotypic) taxa. For example, a
new species intercalated between several sequenced
taxa ranked as classes required the recognition of a
new Class, a new Order, a new Family, and a new
Genus, all including only that one known species. In
the case of ancestral species, these assignments are
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misleading (de Queiroz and Gauthier 1992) because
the ancestor of a clade assigned to the category Order,
for example, does not belong to any of the subordinate
clades assigned to lower categorical levels (Hennig
1966). To eliminate redundant taxa (whether extant or
extinct) and their associated problems, Farris (1976)
proposed abandoning the convention of mandatory
categories (see also de Queiroz and Gauthier 1992).
Patterson and Rosen (1977) also abandoned the convention of mandatory categories, at least for extinct
taxa, as part of their plesion convention. The plesion
was a rankless category for extinct taxa that could be
used at any taxonomic level (i.e., plesions could be
anything from single species to speciose clades). The
combination of sequencing and plesions (or otherwise
eliminating the convention of mandatory categories)
was very effective for reducing the numbers of taxa
and categories used to represent phylogenies. Although formulated within the context of Linnaean taxonomic systems, the sequencing and plesion conventions were not themselves based on the Linnaean hierarchy and effectively limited its role.

Proposals to abandon the Linnaean hierarchy.Given the problems that Phylogenetic Systematics
raised concerning the Linnaean hierarchy, it is not surprising that this movement also produced the first serious proposals to abandon the Linnaean hierarchy.
Several authors constructed taxonomies without using
the Linnaean categories, employing other devices to
represent hierarchical relationships. Once again, Hennig (1969, 1981, 1983) was a pioneer in using numerical prefixes rather than Linnaean categories in his
taxonomies of insects and chordates (see also Griffiths
1974, 1976; L0vtrup 1977; Ereshefsky 1994). Other
authors simply used indentation (e.g., Ax 1987; de
Queiroz 1987; Estes et al. 1988; Gauthier et al. 1988a,
b, 1989; Patterson 1988; Rowe 1988; Laurin 1991; de
Queiroz and Gauthier 1992; Ford and Cannatella 1993;
Sundberg and Pleijel 1994). Although numerical prefixes have been criticized for being cumbersome and
difficult to use in verbal communication (Wiley 1979,
1981; Eldredge and Cracraft 1980; Ax 1987), these
criticisms assume that numerical prefixes are formal
substitutes for the Linnaean categories. On the contrary, they are more appropriately interpreted as simple
devices for representing hierarchical relationships (de
Queiroz and Gauthier 1992). As such, the set of prefixes used in a particular taxonomy is specific to that
publication, and consequently they need not ever be
spoken, memorized, or made consistent with the prefixes used in other taxonomies. Angiospermae, for example, might have the prefix "2" in a taxonomy of
anthophytes, but it might have the prefix
"2.2.2.2.2.2.1" in a taxonomy of spermatophytes.
Such prefixes do not carry any meaning beyond indi-
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eating which taxa are sister groups (e.g., 2.2.2.1 and
2.2.2.2) in taxonomies or taxonomically organized
treatises spanning several to many pages, that is, in
cases where simple indentation is inadequate for conveying the same information.
In addition to avoiding use of the Linnaean hierarchy, several authors presented arguments for abandoning it. Hennig (1969, 1981) argued that use of the Linnaean hierarchy often led to fruitless discussions concerning the categorical assignments of taxa, which he
considered a side-issue that diverted attention from the
fundamental questions of phylogenetic research. Griffiths (1974, 1976) suggested that use of the Linnaean
hierarchy perpetuated confusion between the logical
classes of the Linnaean hierarchy (taxonomic categories), with their historical ties to essentialism, and the
phylogenetic entities of the taxonomic hierarchy
(taxa). Other authors called attention to the nonequivalence of categorical assignments for taxa in different
groups and the practical problem of generating enough
new categories to cover the all hierarchical levels within large clades (e.g., Gauthier et al. 1988a). Several of
these objections were summarized by Ax (1987).
Although the Linnaean hierarchy is not necessary
for constructing hierarchical taxonomies, the problems
noted above are not caused so much by that hierarchy
as by its misinterpretation or misapplication. The Linnaean hierarchy may provide taxonomists with something over which they can engage in fruitless debates,
but those debates stem as much from the misplaced
emphases of taxonomists as from the Linnaean hierarchy itself. Similarly, most taxonomists are aware that
taxa assigned to the Family category, for example, are
not equivalent across more inclusive taxa; the Linnaean hierarchy is therefore not directly responsible for
the fact that some biologists treat such taxa as if they
are equivalent. Likewise, though some systematists
continue to confuse taxa and categories, most are
aware of the distinction. Finally, historical associations
with essentialism are not intrinsic to the Linnaean hierarchy, which can be used as a simple representational device without invoking the metaphysics of essentialism. In short, the criticisms described above can be
addressed, at least in theory, without abandoning the
Linnaean hierarchy, and thus many systematists who
adopt the general phylogenetic perspective underlying
those criticisms continue to use and endorse that hierarchy (e.g., Eldredge and Cracraft 1980; Wiley 1979,
1981; Forey 1992).

Summary.-The Linnaean hierarchy has survived
(for the most part) the evolutionization of taxon concepts, but not without concessions. Although most authors continue to use taxonomic systems based on the
Linnaean hierarchy, many of those systems use a modified hierarchy (i.e., by adding new ranked categories)
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and some incorporate distinctly non-Linnaean elements (e.g., sequencing, rankless categories). Some authors have constructed taxonomies without using the
Linnaean hierarchy and have questioned its continued
use, but the problems they have raised have not been
viewed by other authors as necessary reasons for abandoning the hierarchy. On the other hand, the Linnaean
hierarchy seems to constitute, as J. Gauthier (pers.
comm.) calls it, an "attractive nuisance" -tempting
biologists to treat taxa that are equivalent only in terms
of their Linnaean categorical assignments as if they are
also equivalent in terms of evolutionarily more meaningful properties, and fostering biologically meaningless debates about the categorical assignments of taxa.
This is roughly the present situation, though the next
stage in the process of evolutionization is already beginning.

Most Recent Stages: Systems of Nomenclature
This next stage in the process of evolutionization
will extend a central role for the principle of descent
into the realm of biological nomenclature. In this
realm, the Linnaean hierarchy and the principle of descent serve as alternative first principles from which
other concepts and principles of their respective nomenclatural systems are to be derived, and, consequently, they are in direct conflict. To understand this
conflict, it is first necessary to understand the most
fundamental principle of nomenclature. Therefore, I
will first describe this fundamental principle. I will
then review the Linnaean systems of nomenclature in
current use and a newly proposed phylogenetic system
of nomenclature. I will focus on differences between
these two systems with respect to the fundamental
principle and the consequences of those differences for
nomenclatural practices. Of particular interest will be
the relationship between the names of taxa and the
assignment of those taxa to categories in the Linnaean
hierarchy as well as the advantages of adopting a phylogenetic system of nomenclature. I will also discuss
some potential misunderstandings concerning phylogenetic systems of nomenclature and the consequences
of adopting such a system for the future of the Linnaean hierarchy.

The most fundamental principle of nomenclature.-Biological nomenclature is a vast set of names. The purpose of a nomenclatural system is to govern the application of those names, that is, their use in designating particular taxa. A definition is a statement specifying the meaning of a word. In the context of
biological nomenclature, the words of interest are taxon names, and the meanings of those names are their
designations of particular taxa. Furthermore, most of
the other basic principles of biological nomenclature,
such as those determining which names are to be con-
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sidered synonyms and those determining which of several synonyms is to be considered correct or valid, all
rest directly or indirectly on definitions. Therefore, the
most fundamental principle of any system of biological nomenclature concerns the method by which taxon
names are defined.

Systems of nomenclature in current use.-In current
systems of nomenclature, the definitions of taxon
names are based on the Linnaean hierarchy. Despite
the elaborate nature and codification of these systems,
their method of definition is implicit rather than explicit. Perhaps this attests to the fundamental nature of
definitions, which are so basic that they can be taken
for granted. In any case, the codes say virtually nothing about how taxon names are defined (the Zoological
Code uses the term "definition" for what the Botanical
Code more appropriately calls a description, which
concerns taxa rather than taxon names). Consequently,
the method of definition must be inferred from nomenclatural practices, the most revealing of which are
the practices of taxonomic division and unification
(splitting and lumping). When a single taxon is divided, or when two are united, the application of names
is determined according to categorical assignments and
nomenclatural types, which implies that these two factors are the basis of taxonomic definitions. Thus, the
implicit definition of the name "Asteraceae" is something along the lines of "the taxon including the Genus
Aster that is assigned to the category Family," and the
definition of the name "Liliales" is something along
the lines of "the taxon including the Genus Lilium that
is assigned to the category Order." Because such definitions specify the meanings of taxon names in terms
of the Linnaean taxonomic categories, I will hereafter
refer to them as Linnaean definitions.
The Linnaean method of definition is implicit in the
nomenclatural rules articulated by Linnaeus (1737,
1751), particularly those regarding the division and
unification of genera (see Larson 1971). It was used
in the precursors of the international codes (e.g.,
Strickland et al. 1843; de Candolle 1867) as well as
in early versions of those codes (e.g., me 1906; ICZN
1905), and it has been retained in the modern codes
(ICZN 1985; IUMS 1992; IBC 1994). The Linnaean
method of definition was reinforced by the later nomenclatural convention of using standard endings for
names associated with particular taxonomic categories
(e.g., "-aceae" for plant families, "-ales" for plant
orders, etc.; see Jeffrey 1989). A consequence of this
convention was that implicit Linnaean categorical assignments became built-in to many taxon names.
Because the method of definition is the most fundamental principle of nomenclature, the use of definitions based on the Linnaean hierarchy implies that
the nomenclatural systems embodied in the modern
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Table 2. Phylogenetic definitions. See de Queiroz and Gauthier
(1990, 1992, 1994) for diagrammatic representations of the same
classes of definitions. In the Appendix, the distinction between nodebased and stem-based definitions is illustrated in a proposal that uses
this distinction to eliminate an inconsistency in the botanical code.
Definition type

General structure

Node-based

The clade stemming from the most recent
common ancestor of a and b.•

Stem-based

The clade composed of c and all members of x that share a more recent common ancestor with c than with d.b

Apomorphy-bascd

The clade stemming from the first ancestor of y to evolve character e.c

' Where a and b are organisms, species, or clades.
Where c and d are organisms, species, or clades, and x is a clade
that includes both c and d.
c Where y is an organism, a species, or a clade, and e is a derived
character.
b

codes are Linnaean systems. The conclusion is inescapable that nomenclatural systems of this kind have
survived previous stages in the evolutionization of taxonomy-from the publication of The Origin to the reformulation of taxon concepts. Darwin himself was
involved in the development of an early zoological
code (Strickland et al. 1843) based on the Linnaean
method of definition, and this method has been accepted by almost all subsequent authors (but see below). Nevertheless, the evolutionization of taxon concepts-particularly that involving the higher taxacreated an inconsistency between how taxa were conceptualized and how their names were defined. This
inconsistency was noted by Griffiths (1976:172), who
pointed out that " ... the categories in which taxa are
classified force authors who disagree about the categorical rank of any taxon to apply different names to
it even if they are in full agreement about what organisms the taxon includes", or more generally, that the
dependency of nomenclature on Linnaean categorical
assignments results in different authors applying " ...
the same name to different taxa, or different names to
the same taxon." But few authors concerned themselves with this inconsistency until a new method of
definition, and thus the foundation for an entirely different kind of nomenclatural system, was proposed.

A phylogenetic system of nomenclature.-This new
method of definition is based on the principle of descent. In contrast with Linnaean definitions, which
specify the meanings of taxon names in terms of the
Linnaean taxonomic categories, phylogenetic definitions (de Queiroz and Gauthier 1990, 1992, 1994; see
also de Queiroz 1992a, 1995, 1996; Bryant 1994,
1996; Sundberg and Pleijel 1994; Schander and Thollesson 1995) specify the meanings of taxon names in
terms of ancestry and descent (Table 2). For example,
the name "Asteraceae" might be defined as "the clade
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stemming from the most recent common ancestor of
Barnadesia and Aster" (node-based definition) and the
name "Angiophyta" might be defined as "the clade
composed of Angiospermae and all seed plants that
share a more recent common ancestor with angiosperms than with Gnetales" (stem-based definition)
(see Doyle and Donoghue 1993). Such definitions are
phylogenetic in that the concept of common ancestry
is fundamental to the specified meanings of the defined
names. As I will describe below, the explicitly evolutionary basis of phylogenetic definitions removes the
inconsistency between how taxa are conceptualized
(i.e., after the evolutionization of taxon concepts) and
how their names are defined. In so doing, phylogenetic
definitions provide the foundation for a fundamentally
different approach to biological nomenclature than that
represented by traditional systems based on the Linnaean hierarchy. A system of nomenclature adopting
this new approach is a phylogenetic system in that its
most fundamental principle, the method of definition,
is based on the principle of descent.

Consequences of a phylogenetic system.-Not surprisingly, a change in the basis of the nomenclatural system has consequences for taxonomic practice. Most
importantly, a phylogenetic system would fundamentally alter the application of taxon names. This can be
seen most clearly in an example (Fig. I) comparing
the application of names under Linnaean (Fig. 2) and
phylogenetic (Fig. 3, 4) systems.
In Linnaean systems, definitions are dependent on
the Linnaean hierarchy and thus categorical assignments play a critical role in the application of taxon
names. Consider the example (Fig. l) of a taxon and
its two immediately subordinate taxa under two different Linnaean ranking (categorical assignment)
schemes (Fig. 2) with the following names and Linnaean definitions (these definitions are implicit in the
names but are spelled out here for the sake of completeness): Alphineae = the taxon containing Alpha
that is assigned to the Linnaean category Suborder;
Alphaceae = the taxon containing Alpha that is assigned to the Linnaean category Family; and Alphoideae
the taxon containing Alpha that is assigned to
the Linnaean category Subfamily. Under these Linnaean definitions, a given name can designate different
taxa under different Linnaean ranking schemes; for example, the name "Alphaceae" designates taxon 2 under the first scheme and taxon 1 under the second.
Conversely, a given taxon can be designated by different names under different Linnaean ranking
schemes; for example, taxon I bears the name "Alphineae" under the first scheme and "Alphaceae" under the second. Under Linnaean systems of nomenclature, differences in Linnaean categorical assignments
among authors, or changes in such assignments over
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Fig. 1. Phylogeny of hypothetical taxa used to compare the application of taxon names under Linnaean (Fig. 2) and phylogenetic (Fig.
3, 4) systems of nomenclature. For the example of Linnaean systems (Fig. 2), the names of the terminal taxa are treated as if they are the
names of genera; for the example of phylogenetic systems (Fig. 3, 4), the categorical assignments of the terminal taxa are irrelevant.

time, can have profound consequences regarding the
associations between taxa and taxon names.
In a phylogenetic system, definitions are independent of the Linnaean hierarchy and thus categorical
assignments play no role in the application of taxon
names. Consider the same example (Fig. 1) of a taxon
and its two immediately subordinate taxa under two
different Linnaean ranking schemes (Fig. 3) but with
the following names and node-based phylogenetic definitions: Alphathetonia the clade stemming from the
most recent common ancestor of Alpha and Theta; Alphadeltina = the clade stemming from the most recent
common ancestor of Alpha and Delta; and Thetazetina
= the clade stemming from the most recent common
ancestor of Zeta and Theta. Under these phylogenetic
definitions a given name designates the same taxon
regardless of Linnaean categorical assignments; for example, the name "Alphathetonia" refers to taxon 1
whether that taxon is ranked as a Suborder (Fig. 3,

left) or a Family (Fig. 3, right). Conversely, a given
taxon is designated by the same name regardless of
Linnaean categorical assignments; for example, taxon
3 bears the name "Thetazetina" regardless of whether
that taxon is ranked as a Family (Fig. 3, left) or a
Subfamily (Fig. 3, right). In this example, I have used
neutral endings to avoid Linnaean connotations (e.g.,
that a name ending in "-aceae" is associated with a
taxon assigned to the Family category); however, the
same conclusions would apply even if endings traditionally associated with the Linnaean categories had
been used, provided that the names had been defined
phylogenetically (Fig. 4). Thus, if the name "Alphaceae" (rather than "Alphadeltina") had been defined
as designating the clade stemming from the most recent common ancestor of Alpha and Delta, that name
would be the name of taxon 2 regardless of whether
taxon 2 was ranked as a Family or a Subfamily. Under
a phylogenetic system of nomenclature, differences in

Scheme One
CATEGORY

CATEGORY
Alphineae

Suborder
Family

Scheme Two

Alphaceae

Thetaceae

Family
Subfamily

Alphaceae
Alphoideae

Thetoideae

Fig. 2. The meanings of names defined under Linnaean systems vary depending on Linnaean categorical assignments. The names of
all three taxa (1-3 of Fig. 1) are different under one ranking scheme (left) versus the other (right), and the only name used under both
schemes (Alphaceae) designates a different taxon (2 versus 1) under the different schemes. Types are signified by asterisks(*). See text
for definitions.
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Fig. 3. The meanings of phylogenetically defined names are unaffected by Linnaean categorical assignments I. The names of all three
taxa (1-3 of Fig. I) are identical under the two different Linnaean ranking schemes (left versus right), and all three names designate the
same taxa under the different schemes. Neutral endings have been used to avoid the connotations of endings associated with one of the
Linnaean categories under Linnaean systems of nomenclature. See text for definitions.

Linnaean categorical assignments among authors, or
changes in such assignments over time, have no effect
on the associations between taxa and taxon names. A
given name designates the same taxon and a given
taxon is designated by the same name regardless of
categorical assignments.
The use of phylogenetic definitions has important
consequences for the Linnaean hierarchy. Specifically,
the assignments of taxa to categories in the Linnaean
hierarchy would become superfluous, at least with respect to nomenclature. Categorical assignments would
not have any bearing on the names of taxa, and con-

versely, they would not have any bearing on the meanings of taxon names. Once defined phylogenetically
(and regardless of endings), the name of a taxon would
not change when the rank of the taxon was changed.
For example, the name "Alphadeltina" (or "Alphaceae") would not change simply because the categorical assignment of the taxon designated by that name
changed from Family to Subfamily (Fig. 3, 4). Consequently, the endings or suffixes associated with particular Linnaean categories under the nomenclatural
systems in current use would no longer have any significance in terms of categorical assignment. The fact

Scheme One
CATEGORY

CATEGORY
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Scheme Two
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Alphineae
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Alphaceae

Thetaceae

~

~

Fig. 4. The meanings of phylogenetically defined names are unaffected by Linnaean categorical assignments II. This example is identical
to that illustrated in Fig. 3 except that the names have endings traditionally associated with particular Linnaean categories (in this case,
Suborder, Family, and Subfamily). The names are defined as follows: Alphineae
the clade stemming from the most recent common
ancestor of Alpha and Theta; Alphaceae
the clade stemming from the most recent common ancestor of Alpha and Delta; and Thetaceae
= the clade stemming from the most recent common ancestor of Zeta and Theta. Under these definitions, the names of all three taxa (13 of Fig. I) are identical under the two different Linnaean ranking schemes (left versus right), and all three names designate the same taxa
under the different schemes.
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Fig. 5. Under phylogenetic definitions, names with identical endings can refer to nested rather than mutually exclusive clades. For the
purpose of this example, "Aceraceae" is defined as the clade stemming from the most recent common ancestor of Acer and Dipteronia,
and Sapindaceae is defined as the clade stemming from the most recent common ancestor of Handeliodendron, Hype/ate, Koelreuteria,
Sap indus, Athayana, and Diatenopteryx. Although the names of both taxa end in "-aceae", Aceraceae is a subgroup of Sapindaceae. The
situation with Hippocastanaceae is similar to that for Aceraceae. Names and tree (but not definitions) are from Judd et al. (1994).

that a taxon name ended in "-aceae," for example,
would not imply that the taxon designated by that
name was a Family; it might in fact be an Order, and
it need not be assigned to any Linnaean category at
all. Nor would this ending imply anything about hierarchical relationships. With revised ideas about phylogeny, names with the same ending might tum out to
designate nested (rather than mutually exclusive) taxa.
For example, according to the phylogeny of Judd et
al. (1994), node-based phylogenetic definitions of the
names "Sapindaceae" and "Aceraceae" based on current hypotheses about the composition of the taxa designated by those names implies that Aceraceae is nested within Sapindaceae (Fig. 5). (This situation already
exists, to a certain degree, for names with endings that
do not have a mandatory association with one of the
Linnaean categories, for example, those ending in
"-phyta.") In summary, the evolutionization of taxonomic definitions would render the categorical assignments of taxa irrelevant with respect to nomenclature
and thus reduce the importance of Linnaean hierarchy
considerably.

Advantages of a phylogenetic system.-By granting
the principle of descent a central role in the definitions
of taxon names, the nomenclatural proposal described

above represents yet another stage in the evolutionization of taxonomy. But apart from continuing the historical process of evolutionization, one might ask
why-from the viewpoint of the practicing taxonomist-we would want to make such a fundamental
change. The reason is simple and concerns the basic
goals and purposes of nomenclatural systems in general and the current codes in particular; that is, to promote nomenclatural clarity, universality, and stability.
These concepts can be defined as follows (de Queiroz
and Gauthier 1994): clarity means that the associations
between names and taxa should be unambiguous; universality means that all biologists should use the same
names for the same taxa; and stability means that the
associations between names and taxa should remain
constant over time. Although the current systems of
nomenclature promote nomenclatural clarity, universality, and stability, they do so in an inappropriate theoretical context.
Under the current Linnaean systems of nomenclature, that which is clear, universal, and stable is the
association between a taxon name and one of the Linnaean taxonomic categories. For example, both "Alphaceae", the name of a hypothetical taxon, and
"Brassicaceae", the name of a real taxon, are unam-
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biguously associated with the Family category by all
taxonomists operating under a Linnaean system of nomenclature, and they will remain associated with that
category even if the taxa assigned to it change. Thus,
"Alphaceae" remains associated with the Family category even if the taxon designated by that name
changes from taxon 2 to taxon 1 (Fig. 2) and "Brassicaceae" remains associated with the Family category
even if the taxon designated by that name changes
from a clade that excludes the species referred to Capparaceae to one that includes them (see Judd et al.
1994). But these and other associations with the Linnaean taxonomic categories are not the most relevant
aspect of meaning for the modem taxonomist. Because
of the earlier stages in the evolutionization of taxonomy, taxon names now have at least implicit phylogenetic meanings, and this is true even for those systematists who continue to operate under Linnaean systems of nomenclature. In other words, taxon names
now have associations not only with the Linnaean categories but also with particular parts of the phylogenetic tree of life-that is, with particular clades or the
sets of species of which they are composed.
For anyone who accepts the advances of earlier
stages in the evolutionization of taxonomy, the second
aspect of meaning is more significant. This explains
why taxonomists so often balk at proposals that would
change the circumscription of a taxon and thus the
implicit phylogenetic meaning of its name. Continuing
with the previous hypothetical example (Fig. 2), taxon
2 is a different entity than taxon 1; therefore, changing
the designation of a name from one taxon to the other
goes against clarity, universality, and stability in implicit evolutionary meaning. If some authors accept the
proposal and others reject it, the association of the
name with a particular taxon (clade) is not universal
among authors; consequently, this aspect of the name's
meaning is ambiguous. And even if all biologists eventually come to accept the proposal, the association of
the name with a particular taxon/clade will have
changed over time. If we accept evolutionary concepts
of higher taxa, we can hardly deny that Linnaean systems of nomenclature fail to accomplish their primary
purpose.
In contrast with the situation under Linnaean systems of nomenclature, under a phylogenetic system,
that which is clear, universal, and stable is the association between a taxon name and a clade or monophyletic group of species. Under Linnaean definitions,
names have no explicit associations with clades or
monophyletic taxa; any such associations are implicit.
Phylogenetic definitions make those associations explicit by expressly defining taxon names as designating
particular taxa (clades). Consequently, the association
of a taxon name with a clade or monophyletic group
of species becomes the most fundamental aspect of the
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name's meaning. That is to say, association of the
name with a part of phylogeny becomes more important than its association with one of the Linnaean categories. This is the reason that the associations between names and taxa are unaffected by changes in
categorical assignments, as is illustrated in the examples above (Fig. 3, 4). Thus, provided that all authors
adopt the same definitions (as presumably they would
under a phylogenetic code), they will apply the same
names to the same taxa. By emphasizing phylogenetic
relationships instead of categorical assignments, phylogenetic definitions promote nomenclatural clarity,
universality, and stability in terms of a theoretically
significant aspect of meaning.

Clarifications.-Replacing the foundation of the nomenclatural system would constitute a minor revolution, at least within systematic biology. One might
therefore expect that the change will not be made easily. Considering the previous stage in the evolutionization of taxonomy reinforces this concern. During the
1970s and 80s, bitter intellectual battles were fought
over concepts of higher taxa, and debates continue to
the present (e.g., Stuessy 1997). In addition, the principles and rules of nomenclature are formalized to a
much greater degree than concepts of higher taxa ever
were. Concepts of higher taxa were never endorsed by
official congresses, commissions, or committees, nor
were they formalized in published codes. If resistance
to change is correlated with degree of formalization,
then we can expect future battles over nomenclature
to be even more bitter than past ones over concepts of
higher taxa. For this reason, I would like to clarify
some areas of potential confusion in hopes of avoiding
criticisms based solely on misunderstandings.
Implications for the Linnaean hierarchy, hierarchical taxonomies, and names.-Several potential misunderstandings concern the implications of a phylogenetic system of nomenclature for certain taxonomic
traditions, in particular, the Linnaean hierarchy, hierarchical taxonomies, and familiar taxon names. Although adopting a phylogenetic system of nomenclature would greatly limit the importance of the Linnaean hierarchy in the realm of nomenclature, it would
not require total elimination of the Linnaean hierarchy
from taxonomy. That is to say, taxa could still be categorized (ranked) as Orders, Families, Subfamilies,
etc., even if those categorical assignments had no influence on taxon names. The categories would then be
treated as simple representational devices lacking both
theoretical and nomenclatural significance, much like
the numerical prefixes discussed above. On the other
hand, a phylogenetic system of nomenclature would
permit total elimination of the Linnaean hierarchy
from taxonomy; otherwise, total elimination of the
Linnaean hierarchy is impossible. As long as the ap-
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plication of taxon names is governed by a Linnaean
system of nomenclature, even taxonomies that avoid
explicit use of the Linnaean categories are still using
those categories implicitly.
A second potential misunderstanding concerns the
hierarchical structure of taxonomies. Even if the Linnaean hierarchy is totally eliminated from taxonomy,
this does not mean that taxonomies would no longer
be hierarchical. As noted above, the Linnaean hierarchy of taxonomic categories should not be confused
with hierarchical taxonomies in general. A system of
ranked taxonomic categories is not the only way to
represent nested hierarchical relationships, which can
be represented using branching diagrams, Venn diagrams, numeric prefixes, indentation, and various other
devices. Because nested, hierarchical taxonomic structure is a deduction from the principle of descent, it
cannot be contradicted by a method of definition derived from that same principle.
A third potential misunderstanding is the idea that
eliminating the Linnaean hierarchy means eliminating
or replacing established and familiar taxon names. Linnaean definitions can be replaced with phylogenetic
definitions without replacing the names themselves.
For example, the name "Adoxaceae" is traditionally
defined (implicitly) as "the Family containing the Genus Adoxa," but the same name could be redefined
phylogenetically as "the most recent common ancestor
of Viburnum, Sambucus, [and] Adoxa, and all of its
descendants" (Judd et al. 1994:25). The names need
not change, only their definitions. Alternatively, new
names could be coined (e.g., using different endings)
to emphasize their novel definitional basis (e.g., Kron
1997). The advantage of redefining existing names is
continuity with the previous literature; the disadvantage is their Linnaean connotations (e.g., "Adoxaceae" might be assumed to be the name of a Family
even if the taxon designated by that name was assigned to a different Linnaean category or if it was not
assigned to a Linnaean category at all). The advantage
of coining new names is that they would have no Linnaean connotations; the disadvantage is loss of continuity with the previous literature.
Clarity, universality, and stability.-By explicitly
associating taxon names with particular taxa (clades),
phylogenetic definitions promote the unambiguous application of names to taxa, and in this respect they also
promote the development of a universal and stable nomenclature. Linnaean definitions also promote the unambiguous application of names to taxa and the development of a universal and stable nomenclature,
though they do so in very different theoretical context.
In an ontological sense, acceptance of a definitionwhether Linnaean or phylogenetic--ensures that a particular name will always be applied to the same taxon.
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Sameness in this context refers to an ideal truth-the
true taxon assigned to a particular Linnaean category
(whatever that may mean) or the true clade as it exists
in reality (as opposed to our conjectures about reality).
Such truths, however, cannot be known with certainty.
Because names can only be applied in the context of
taxonomic hypotheses, there can be no guarantee that
the taxon to which a particular name is applied will
be identical in terms of its hypothesized composition
from one taxonomic hypothesis to the next, and this is
the case under both Linnaean and phylogenetic systems of nomenclature.
Under Linnaean systems, different authors will only
apply the same names to taxa of identical hypothesized
composition if those authors both recognize taxa of
identical composition and assign those taxa to the
same categories in the Linnaean hierarchy (e.g., if they
all adopt the ranking scheme on one side, left or right,
of Fig. 2). If different authors recognize taxa that differ
in composition, or if categorical assignments differ between authors (e.g., if some adopt the scheme on the
left side of Fig. 2 and others adopt the scheme on the
right), then those authors will not apply the same
names to taxa of identical composition. Categorical assignments are irrelevant under phylogenetic systems
(Fig. 3), but taxonomic hypotheses are critical to the
application of taxon names. Under phylogenetic systems, different authors will only apply the same names
to taxa of identical hypothesized composition if the
relevant aspects of their phylogenies are the same. If
the relevant aspects of the phylogenies differ between
authors, then those authors will not apply the same
names to taxa of identical composition (Fig. 6; see also
de Queiroz and Gauthier, 1990; de Queiroz 1996). Differences or changes in ideas about phylogenetic relationships can also lead to differences in the hypothesized composition of taxa under Linnaean systems
(Fig. 7; see also de Queiroz 1996).
These examples illustrate that neither phylogenetic
nor Linnaean systems guarantee clarity, universality,
and stability in terms of hypotheses about the relationships and composition of taxa. The reason is that both
types of nomenclatural systems clearly separate taxonomic hypotheses from nomenclatural rules. Taxonomic hypotheses, ideas about relationships and the
composition of taxa, must be free to differ and change
if taxonomy is to be a nonauthoritarian and evolving
discipline. Therefore, in both Linnaean and phylogenetic systems of nomenclature, rules governing the application of names are deliberately formulated so that
they are independent of specific taxonomic hypotheses. That is to say, both systems deliberately separate
the purely formal process of applying names from the
more creative and intellectual processes of reconstructing phylogeny and, in the case of the Linnaean system,
assigning ranks. One consequence of this separation is
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Alphathetonia • Alphadeltina

Thetazetina
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Thetazetina
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Fig. 6. The hypothesized composition of taxa designated by phylogenetically defined names can vary depending on the accepted
phylogeny. The Gamma-Delta clade is most closely related to the Alpha-Beta clade in the scheme (phylogeny) on the left but to the
Epsilon-Theta clade in the scheme (phylogeny) on the right. The name "Aiphadeltina," defined as the clade stemming from the most recent
common ancestor of Alpha and Delta, designates a clade that includes four terminal taxa (Alpha-Delta) in the context of the former
phylogeny, but it designates a clade that includes all eight terminal taxa (Alpha-Theta) in the context of the latter.

that names governed by either system can be applied
unambiguously under any taxonomic hypotheses
framed within the general context of that system-that
is, under any hypothesis about relationships (under
phylogenetic systems) or about relationships and categorical assignments (under Linnaean systems). This
permits the same names to be applied unambiguously
as taxonomic knowledge is continually improved and
refined. Another consequence is that the hypothesized

composition of taxa is only guaranteed to be unambiguous, universal, and stable when authors agree
about the relevant aspects of their taxonomic hypotheses.
The difference between Linnaean and phylogenetic
systems of nomenclature thus boils down to a difference in how taxonomic hypotheses are conceptualized,
which is related to the difference in the underlying
bases of those systems. In Linnaean systems, the Lin-

Scheme One

Scheme Two

SO. Alphineae

F. Alphaceae. Thetaceae

F. Alphaceae

F.Thetaceae

SF. Thetoideae

Fig. 7. The hypothesized composition of taxa designated by names defined using Linnaean definitions can vary depending on the
accepted phylogeny. The Gamma-Delta clade is most closely related to the Alpha-Beta clade in the scheme (phylogeny and set of categorical
assignments) on the left but to the Epsilon-Theta clade in the scheme (phylogeny and set of categorical assignments) on the right. The
name "Alphaceae," defined as the clade including Alpha that is assigned to the Family category, designates a clade that includes four
terminal taxa (Alpha-Delta) in the context of the former scheme, but it designates a clade that includes all eight terminal taxa (AlphaTheta) in the context of the latter. Notice that composition of the taxon designated by the name "Thetaceae" also differs between the two
schemes. Because the designations of names defined using Linnaean definitions depend on categorical assignments, other designations are
possible. For example, in the context of the phylogeny (but not the categorical assignments) on the right, "Alphaceae" might refer to a
clade that includes only two terminal taxa (Alpha and Beta), rather than four or eight, in which case the Gamma-Delta clade would either
be recognized as its own Family or be included in Thetaceae, thus creating a difference in the composition of that taxon between the two
phylogenetic hypotheses. (F=Family, SF=Subfarnily, SO=Suborder.)
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naean hierarchy is fundamental to the conceptualization of taxonomic hypotheses in that the application of
taxon names requires assignment of taxa to categories
in the Linnaean hierarchy. Nevertheless, the principle
of descent is also important in that hypotheses about
phylogenetic relationships affect ideas about the composition of taxa. In phylogenetic systems, the principle
of descent is fundamental to the conceptualization of
taxonomic hypotheses in that the application of taxon
names requires a phylogeny; the Linnaean hierarchy,
however, is irrelevant. Consequently, in Linnaean systems, universality and stability in the hypothesized
composition of taxa designated by particular names are
compromised by differences or changes in ideas about
both phylogenetic relationships and categorical assignments, while in phylogenetic systems, they are compromised only by differences or changes in ideas about
relationships. In other words, as the basis for a system
of nomenclature, the Linnaean hierarchy interferes
with effective communication about evolutionary taxa
by allowing differences in categorical assignments to
generate ambiguity, nonuniversality, and instability
even when there is complete agreement about phylogenetic relationships.

Phylogenetic knowledge.-Perhaps the most common misconception about a phylogenetic system of
nomenclature is that its use requires more extensive
and definitive knowledge about phylogeny than is currently available for many groups. On the contrary, a
phylogenetic system requires neither extensive nor definitive knowledge about phylogeny. As noted above,
a phylogenetic system allows names to be applied unambiguously and consistently in the context of alternative phylogenies, which implies that use of such a
system does not require definitive phylogenetic knowledge but only the willingness to make phylogenetic
conjectures. Phylogenetic hypotheses do not have to
be certain or correct, but they do have to be put forward.
Indeed, the impossibility of obtaining definitive
phylogenetic knowledge-that is, the fallibility and
concomitant impermanence of phylogenetic hypotheses-is the reason for having a formal system of nomenclature. If all the details of phylogeny were known
with certainty, there would be no need to concern ourselves about how to apply names to taxa; it would be
obvious. Our ideas about phylogeny would never
change; hence there would be no alternative taxonomic
hypothesis nor any need for rules about how to apply
existing taxon names in the context of alternative hypotheses. But this is not how taxonomy works. Reconstructed phylogenies are provisional hypotheses
that are continually being revised and refined. Unless
we want to replace or redefine existing names every
time a new phylogeny is proposed, we need rules for
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applying those names unambiguously in the context of
new phylogenetic hypotheses. In short, the purpose of
a phylogenetic system of nomenclature is not to provide rules for applying names after we figure out all
the details of phylogeny; instead, its purpose is to provide rules for applying names in a phylogenetically
meaningful way as we continue to work out those details.
CONCLUSION

The Linnaean hierarchy has been an integral part of
biological taxonomy for nearly two and a half centuries. It has proved highly useful for representing the
hierarchical relationships of taxa, and it has experienced remarkable longevity. One of the greatest triumphs of the Linnaean hierarchy and a factor that was
probably critical to its longevity, in particular, its persistence into modem taxonomy, was the ease with
which it accommodated an evolutionary world view.
Indeed, the groups-within-groups structure of the Linnaean hierarchy seemed almost ideally suited for representing the structure of taxonomic relationships implied by the principle of common descent.
If the Linnaean hierarchy had been used only as a
device for representing hierarchical relationships, similar to the numerical prefixes or indentation of later
authors, it might never have come into direct conflict
with the principle of descent. But the Linnaean hierarchy was treated as more than a simple representational device; it was granted considerable theoretical
significance. For most taxonomists after Linnaeus, the
very concept of a taxon became inseparable from that
taxon's categorical assignment, and this was reflected
in the systems of nomenclature developed by those
taxonomists. This explains why taxonomists commonly confused taxa and categories (Mayr 1969a; Griffiths
1976), why they placed so much emphasis on categorical assignments-as manifested in their frequent
debates about the categorical assignments of taxa
(Hennig 1969, 1981), and most importantly, why they
used a method of definition in which associations with
the Linnaean taxonomic categories are fundamental to
the meanings of taxon names.
Because the theoretical significance granted to Linnaean categorical assignments is most evident in Linnaean taxonomic definitions, it is not surprising that a
conflict between the Linnaean hierarchy and the principle of descent has arisen in the area of nomenclature.
This conflict arises because systems of nomencJature
based on the Linnaean hierarchy effectively grant more
importance to the association of a name with one of
the Linnaean categories than with a unit of common
descent (de Queiroz and Gauthier 1994). Although resolution of this conflict does not require total elimination of the Linnaean hierarchy from taxonomy, it does

142

de Queiroz

require nearly complete restructuring of the nomenclatural systems in current use, replacing the Linnaean
hierarchy with the principle of descent as the basis for
those systems. A consequence of this change is that
the significance of the Linnaean hierarchy will be
greatly reduced. The Linnaean hierarchy will become
irrelevant to nomenclature, and in so becoming, it will
lose most of its former implicit theoretical significance. Fortunately, this fate seems appropriate.
In Linnaeus's time and for nearly 100 years afterward, the theoretical significance granted to the Linnaean hierarchy was not unreasonable. At that time, it
was at least conceivable that life's diversity was organized into a fixed number of discrete hierarchical
levels, which might have been designated by the categories of the Linnaean hierarchy. Alternatively, if
taxa were merely artificial collections of organisms,
then the number of categorical levels could be dictated
solely by convenience. After acceptance of the principle of descent, however, the interpretation of taxa as
evolutionary units rather than artificial collections of
organisms directly contradicted the latter position and
made the position untenable. The continuity of descent
and the presumed frequent and continual branching of
phylogeny contradicted the notion of a fixed number
of discrete hierarchical levels; certainly, the possibility
that the hierarchical structure of life's diversity could
be fully accommodated with seven or even 100 taxonomic categories became inconceivable. Consequently, although taxonomists after Darwin have continued
to grant considerable implicit significance to the Linnaean categories through their use of Linnaean definitions, they have explicitly called the significance of
those categories into question. Specifically, they have
acknowledged that the assignment of Linnaean categorical ranks, particularly above the species level, is
subjective, arbitrary, and artificial (e.g., Simpson 1961;
Davis and Heywood 1963; Mayr 1969a).
In this context, one of the most important outcomes
of the evolutionization of taxonomy was that it effectively proposed alternative taxonomic categories of
greater theoretical significance. By equating species
with evolving population lineages, the New Systematics replaced an artificial category with a evolutionarily meaningful one. Because that new category was
given the same name, "species," the species category
became natural--or at least theoretically significant.
Similarly, by equating higher taxa with clades, groups
of species united by common descent, Phylogenetic
Systematics identified another evolutionarily meaningful category. Because that category was given a different name, "clade," the higher Linnaean categories
did not thereby become natural or theoretically significant; instead, they remained arbitrary ranks assigned
to entities of a single kind, though now the entities
themselves became natural--or at least theoretically
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significant. This change also emphasized the distinction between the natural higher taxa and the artificial
Linnaean categories to which they were assigned.
As biological taxonomy has progressively reformulated its basic concepts and principles to reflect an
ever more fully evolutionary world view, it should
have become apparent that the significant taxonomic
categories are not Kingdom, Division, Class, Order,
Family, Genus, and Species (in the Linnaean sense);
the significant categories are clade and species (in the
evolutionary sense). The taxa that make up these categories exist at a multitude of hierarchical levels, far
too many to be accommodated by the standard Linnaean hierarchy, and their names can only be adequately defined through explicit reference to common
descent. Now that we have figured out what are the
theoretically significant taxonomic categories, as well
as how to reformulate our nomenclatural systems to
make them consistent with those categories, the importance of the Linnaean hierarchy has been reduced
to the point where we must seriously consider whether
it is worth retaining. The Linnaean hierarchy has become obsolete.
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APPENDIX.
A PROPOSAL TO ELIMINATE REDUNDANCY IN PLANT TAXON NAMES
BASED ON PHYLOGENETIC DEFINITIONS
The distinction between node-based and stem-based definitions
(Table 2) can be used to eliminate an inconsistency in the Botanical
Code (IBC 1994) involving redundant taxon names. One of the basic
principles of the Botanical Code, Principle IV, states that each taxonomic group can bear only one correct name. However, the Code
tolerates several exceptions to this basic principle in the form of
alternative names, such as "Asteraceae" and "Compositae", "Poaceae" and "Grarnineae", and five other pairs, sanctioned under
Article 18. A useful way to eliminate this redundancy, yet preserve
all the names, would be to use a node-based definition to define one
name of each pair as designating a crown group and a stem-based
definition to define the other as designating the more inclusive clade
including both the crown and its extinct relatives. Zoologists have
adopted a similar convention for comparable cases, such as those of
"Anura" (frogs) and "Salienta" (Anura and its extinct relatives),
"Caudata" (salamanders) and "Urodela" (Caudata and its extinct
relatives), and "Gymnophiona" (caecilians) and "Apoda" (Gymnophiona and its extinct relatives) (e.g., de Queiroz and Gauthier
1992; Cannatella and Hillis 1993; Ford and Cannatella 1993). As
for which name should be used for which clade, one alternative
would be to tie the names whose suffixes conform with those of
other taxa traditionally ranked as families (i.e., those ending in
"-aceae"), as well as the names of those other taxa, to crown clades.
The names whose suffixes do not conform (i.e., those ending in
"-ae") would then be tied to the more inclusive clades consisting
of the crowns plus all extinct plants that share a more recent common ancestor with those crowns than with other extant plants. The
obvious advantage of this alternative is consislency in the endings
of the names in terms of their reference to crown versus stem clades.
On the other hand, if the names with nonconforming endings are
judged to be more widely known and used, then it might be preferable to use those names for the appropriate crown clades following
the reasoning of de Queiroz and Gauthier ( 1992).

